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ADDICTION APPROACH
ABSTRACT
This paper applies the rational addiction model, which emphasizes the interdependency of
past, current, and future consumption of an addictive good, to the demand for cocaine by young
adults in the Monitoring the Future Panel. The price of cocaine is added to this survey from the
System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) maintained by the Drug Enforcement
Administration of the U.S, Department of Justice. Results suggest that annual participation and
frequency of use given participation are negatively related to the price of cocaine. In addition current
participation is positively related to past and future participation, and current frequency of use given
participation is positively related to past and future frequency of use. The long-run price elasticity
of total consumption (participation multiplied by frequency given participation) of -1.18 is
substantial. A permanent 10 percent reduction in price due, for example, to the legalization of
cocaine would cause the number of cocaine users to grow by slightly more than 8 percent and would
increase the frequency of use among users by a little more than 3 percent. Surely, both proponents
and opponents of drug legalization should take account of this increase in consumption in debating
their respective positions.
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FJC @UIC.EDUThe period from the late 1980s to the present has witnessed a lively debate concerning the
costs and benefits of legalization of such substances as cocaine, marijuana, and heroin.
Legalization of these hatilly addictive goods surely will reduce their prices. 1 By the law of the
downward-sloping demand function, their consumption will rise. Prices will also fall and
consumption will rise if these substances remain illegal, but resources allocated to enforcement
activities are permanently lowered. But by how much will consumption rise? According to
conventional wisdom, which is adopted by some proponents of legalization, the consumption of
these illegal addictive substances is not very responsive to price. Opponents of legalization argue
that consumption may be quite responsive to price based in part on research on the demand for
two widely used legal addictive substances--alcohol and cigarettes--particularly by teenagers and
young adults.2
The conventional wisdom that the demand for addictive substances is not sensitive to price
also is contradicted by Becker and Murphy’s (1988) theoretical model of addictive behavior
which assumes that addicts behave rationally. The main element of this and other models of
addictive behavior is that an increase in past consumption of an addictive good raises the marginal
utility of current consumption and therefore raises current consumption. A key feature of the
Becker-Murphy model which distinguishes it from other models of addictive behavior is that
addicts are rational or farsighted in the sense that they anticipate the expected fiture
consequences of their current actions. This is in sharp contrast to myopic models of addiction in
which consumers ignore the effects of current consumption on fiture utility when they determine
the optimal or utility-maximizing quantity of an addictive good in the present period.
The Becker-Murphy model predicts intertemporal complementarily of consumption or
negative cross price effects and a long-run own price elasticity of demand which exceeds theshort-run elasticity (the former allows past consumption to vary while the latter does not).
Intertemporal complementarily arises because increases in past or fiture consumption (caused by
reductions in past or fiture prices) cause current consumption to rise. Put differently, the
reitiorcement property of an addictive good, which is emphasized by psychologists, suggests that
an increase in past consumption raises the marginal benefit of current consumption. By symmetry,
an increase in fiture consumption also raises the marginal benefit of current consumption.
Reinforcement produces the gap between the long-run and short-run price elasticities. Since this
property does not hold for a non-addictive good, the long-run price elasticity of demand is
expected to be larger for addictive than for non-addictive goods.
The purpose of this paper is to inform the debate on legalization by providing estimates of
the price elasticity of demand for cocaine consumption in the context of the rational addiction
model. These estimates also are usefil in evaluating policies such as crop reduction and criminal
justice that raise price. There are few previous empirical studies in this area, and no previous
attempts to study the demand for illegal drugs with a panel of individuals in the context of rational
addiction because data on prices and quantities consumed of illegal drugs have been dificult to
acquire. The data employed in this study consist of the panel formed from the nationally
representative cross-sectional surveys of high school seniors conducted each year since 1975 by
the Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan as part of the Monitoring the
Future research program, The members of the panel range in age from seventeen through twenty-
nine. Since the prevalence of cocaine consumption is highest in this age range, and few people
initiate use afier age twenty-nine (National Institute on Drug Abuse 1991), information on the
responsiveness to price in this segment of the population is crucial in evaluating the impacts of
2alternative price policies in all segments of the population. The price of cocaine is taken from the
System to Retrieve Ifiorrnation from Drug Evidence (STRIDE) database maintained by the Drug
Etiorcement Administration of the U, S. Department of Justice,
We find that cocaine consumption by young adults is addictive in the sense that increases
in past or fiture consumption cause current consumption to rise. The positive and significant
fiture consumption effect is consistent with the hypothesis of rational addiction and inconsistent
with the hypothesis of myopic addiction. The long-inn price elasticity of-1,18 is substantial and
approximately 70 percent larger than the short-run price elasticity.
1, Prior Studies
Prior to the 1990s, there were very few studies on the effects of price on the use of
cocaine, marijuana, heroin, or other illegal drugs. Nisbet and Vakil (1972) report a price elasticity
of demand for marijuana ranging from -0,36 to -1.51 in an anonymous mail sumey of students at
the University of California at Los Angeles, Silverman and Sprull (1977) estimate the price
elasticity of demand for heroin in an indirect manner from the relationship between crime and the
price of heroin in a monthly time series of forty-one neighborhoods in Detroit. They obtain an
elasticity of-0,27.
DiNardo (1993) studies the effect of cocaine price on cocaine use in the past month using
the 1977-1987 Monitoring the Future high school senior surveys. Our panels are formed from
these baseline surveys, DiNardo did not have access to the individual data, and his results are
based on aggregations to the state level. Thus, his outcome is the fraction of high school seniors
in a state who used cocaine in the past month in a time series of state cross sections. This
3outcome is not sensitive to the price of cocaine. van Ours (1995) examines the demand for opium
in Indonesia from 1923 through 1938, and Liu, Liu, and Chow (1996) perform a similar analysis
of the demand for opium in Taiwan from 1914 through 1942. By allowing present consumption
to depend on past consumption, these two studies are the only ones to explicitly allow for
addiction. van Ours obtains a substantial long-run elasticity of-1.00, which is approximately 40
percent larger than the short-run price elasticity. He also estimates an elasticity of the annual
number of opium users with respect to price that ranges from -.30 to -.40 Liu, Liu, and Chow
also obtain a substantial long-inn elasticity of-1.22, which is over 300 percent larger than the
short-run elasticity. Neither study finds evidence of rational addiction because the coefficient of
fiture consumption is not significant when this variable is included in the demand finctions.3
Saffer and Chaloupka (1996) consider monthly and annual cocaine and heroin
participation (use in the past month or use in the past year) as outcomes in the 1988, 1990, and
1991 National Household Surveys of Drug Abuse conducted by the National Institute of Drug
Abuse. The past year cocaine participation elasticity with respect to its price is -0.44, and the
corresponding elasticity for heroin is -0.82. The price elasticities for participation in the past
month are -0.28 in the case of cocaine and -0,94 in the case of heroin. Using the percentage of
arrestees testing positive for cocaine and heroin in the Drug Use Forecasting System and specific
assumptions about the relationship between drug use and the probability of arrest, Caulkins
(1996b) estimates price elasticities of demand of-2.50 for cocaine and -1.50 for heroin.
Bretteville-Jensen and Sutton (1996) study the price responsiveness of heroin in a sample of 500
users in Oslo, Norway, Unlike the other studies conducted in the 1990s, they rely on self-
4reported price data. They find a price elasticity of demand of-1.23 for non-dealing users (66
percent of the sample) and a price elasticity of demand of-0.20 for users who are also dealers.~
Between 1973 and 1978, eleven U.S. states enacted laws that decriminalize the possession
of small amounts of marijuana. Although the possession and use of this substance is not filly
legal in these states, first offense possessions are civil (not criminal) offenses with small fines of
typically less than $100 for possession of less than one ounce, Thus, the enactment of these laws
reduced the “fill price” of marijuana, defined as the sum of the money price and the expected
penalty for possession. Johnston, Bachman, and O’Malley(1981 ) find no effect of
decriminalization on marijuana use in the 1975-1989 Monitoring the Future high school senior
surveys and in the panels formed from the first two surveys. DiNardo and Lemieux (1992) report
a similar finding in the time series of state cross sections formed by DiNardo (1993) from
Monitoring the Future as described above. Theius and Register (1993) replicate this result in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. On the other hand, Model (1993) finds that
decriminalization increased use based on hospital emergency room episodes related to marijuana
in the Drug Abuse Warning Network.
The Becker-Murphy (1988) rational addiction model has been applied successfully to the
demand for cigarettes byChaloupka(1991); Keeler, Hu, Bamett, and Manning (1993); and
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), It also has been applied successfully to the demand for
alcohol by Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1996) and to the demand for gambling by Mobi[ia
(1990). All these studies report negative and significant price effects, positive and significant past
and fiture consumption effects, and larger long-run than short-run price elasticities.II. Analwical Framework
Following Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), we assume that consumers maximize a
lifetime utility finction given by
m t-1
V=X ~ U(Yt, Ct, Ct ~, et). (1)
t= 1
Here Yt is consumption of a non-addictive good at time or age t, C, is consumption of an
addictive good (cocaine in our case) at age t, Cl.l is cocaine consumption at age t-1, et reflects the
effects of unmeasured life cycle variables on utility, and ~ is the time discount factor
[~= 1/(1 + r), where r is the rate of time preference for the present].5 An increase in lagged
cocaine consumption (Ct.1) lowers utility if the addiction is harmful (8U/~t.l < O), while an
increase in the lagged consumption raises utility if the addiction is beneficial (~U/Mt.l > 0), In
this paper, presumably, the partial derivative just defined is negative, although the model simply
assumes that this term is nonzero. Regardless of the nature of the addiction, an increase in past
consumption must raise the marginal utility of Ct in order for an increase in past consumption of
C to increase current consumption.
When the utility finction is quadratic and the rate of time preference for the present is
equal to the market rate of interest, equation (1) generates a structural demand finction for
consumption of C of the form
C,= eC,.1 + ~9C,+l + elPt + ezel + O~et+l. (2)
Here P~is the price of C,, and the intercept is suppressed. Since 8 is positive and 81 is negative,
current consumption is positively related to past and fiture consumption (Cl.1and Ct+l,
respectively) and negatively related to current price. In particular, 0 measures the effect of an
6increase in past consumption on the marginal utility of current consumption. By symmetry, it also
measures the effect of an increase in fiture consumption on the marginal impact of current
consumption on next period’s utility. The larger the value of 6 the greater is the degree of
reitiorcement or addiction.
Equation (2) is the basis of the empirical analysis in this paper, Note that ordinary least
squares estimation of the equation might lead to biased estimates of the parameters of interest.
The unobserved variables that affect utility in each period are likely to be serially correlated, Even
if these variables are uncorrelated, Ci.1and Cl+l depend on el and el+lthrough the optimizing
behavior. These relationships imply that an ordinary least squares estimation of the equation
might incorrectly imply that past and fiture consumption affect current consumption, even when
the true value of e is zero, Fortunately, the specification in equation (2) suggests a way to solve
the endogeneity problem. The equation implies that current consumption is independent of past
and fiture prices when past and fiture consumption are held constant; any effect of past or future
prices on current consumption must come through their effects on past or fiture consumption.
Provided that the unobservable are uncorrelated with prices in these periods, past and fiture
prices are logical instruments for past and future consumption, since past prices directly affect
past consumption, and fiture prices directly affect fiture consumption,
strategy amounts to estimating equation (2) by two-stage least squares,
Therefore, the empirical
with past and future
prices serving as instrumental variables for past and fiture consumption.
This strategy can be modified when measures of some of the life cycle events that affect
utility and therefore partially determine Q, such as marital status and unemployment, are available,
If &U/~%+l~t.equals zero, while &U/~e~Nt is nonzero, Cl depends on et but not on ei+lin
7equation (2). Then current marital status, for example, is a relevant regressor in the structural
demand finction given by equation (2), and past and fiture marital status are instruments for past
and fiture consumption,
The statistical significance of the coefficient of fiture consumption provides a direct test
of a rational model of addiction against an alternative model in which consumers are myopic. In
the latter model they fail to consider the impact of current consumption on fiture utility and
fiture consumption. That is, the myopic version of equation (2) is entirely backward looking. In
it current consumption depends only on current price, lagged consumption, the marginal utility of
wealth (which is one of the determinants of the current price coefficient), and current events,
Because of these distinctions, myopic models and rational models have different implications
about responses to fiture changes, In particular, rational addicts increase their current
consumption when fiture prices are expected to fall, but myopic addicts do not.
Equation (2) implies intertemporal complementarily or negative cross price elasticities
between cocaine consumption at various points in time. These effects pertain to changes in the
price of cocaine in period t on consumption in period t. They are temporary in nature since prices
in other periods are held constant. For example, a reduction in price in period t-1 (P~.l)with
prices in all other periods held constant will increase consumption in that period. In turn, Cl will
rise since 6 is positive. Along the same lines, a reduction in Pi+l with prices in all other periods
held constant will increase Ct+l, which will increase Ct since ~6 is positive.
Equation (2) also implies that there are important differences between long- and short-run
responses to permanent price changes (price changes in more than one period) in the case of
addiction. The short-run price effect describes the response to a change in price in period t and all
8fiture periods that is not anticipated until period t. The long-run price effect pertains to a price
change in ~ periods. Since Ct.1remains the same if a price change is not anticipated until period
t, the long-run price effect must exceed the short-run price effect,
These results can be seen more formally by solving the second-order difference equation in
(2). The solution, which is contained in Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), results in an
equation in which consumption in period t depends on prices and life-cycle variables in all periods,
The roots of this difference equation are
$,= [I -(I - 4e2p)’f’l/2e, $, = [1 + (I - 4e2p)1’21/2e, (3)
with 4e2~ <1, +1 <1, and ~’ > 1 all for stability. Given these roots, the temporary current, past,
and fiture price effects are
Wt/aP, = e,Ie02 (4a)
W,/~Pt.l = e,ie(~)’ (4b)
m,/aPl+l = el@l/e$2. (4C)
All are negative since el is negative. The short-run price effect is
w,/m = el/[e(l - $1)~21, (5)
while the long-run price effect is
dc/dP = el/[e(l - $1)($2- 1)1= e,/(1 - Q- pe). (6)
The ratio of equation (6) to equation (5) equals ~/(@2 – 1). This ratio must exceed 1 since $2
exceeds 1.
III. Data and Em~irical Implementation
A. SampleEach year since 1975 the University of Michigan’s Institute for Social Research has
conducted a nationally representative random sample of between 15,000 and 19,000 high school
setiors during the months of March and April as part of the Monitoring the Future research
program. These surveys, which are described in detail by Johnston, O’Malley, and Bachman
(1994), focus on the use of illegal drugs, alcohol, and cigarettes. Starting with the class of 1976,
a sample of approximately 2,400 individuals in each senior class has been chosen for followup.
Individuals reporting current daily marijuana use or use of any other illegal drugs in the past 30
days in their senior year are selected with a higher probability (by a factor of 3). The 2,400
selected respondents are divided into two groups of 1,200 each; one group is surveyed in even-
numbered calendar years, while the other group is surveyed in odd-numbered calendar years. As
a result of this design, one group of panels (termed the A panels from now on) is resurveyed for
the first time one year after baseline (the senior year in high school), while the other group
(termed the B panels from now on) is resurveyed for the first time two years afier baseline.
Subsequent followups are conducted at two year intervals for both groups.
We estimate cocaine demand finctions using the nineteen panels formed from the high
school senior surveys conducted from 1976 through 1985. b The last followup in our data set,
which contains approximately 22,800 persons, took place in 1989. We have between one and five
observations on each person since we require information on current, past, and fiture
consumption of cocaine. For example, the first observation on a given person pertains to the first
followup (which could have taken place from 1978 through 1987) with past consumption of
cocaine taken from baseline (1976 through 1985) and fiture consumption taken from the second
follow-up (1980 through 1989). The last observation pertains to the next to the last followup
10(1986 or 1987) with past consumption taken from the second to the last followup or from
baseline (1984 or 1985) and fiture consumption taken horn the lastfollowup(1988 or 1989).
Since an annual measure of consumption is used in the regressions, past consumption coincides
with the second annual lag and fiture consumption coincides with the second annual lead.’ For
the A panels, we have five observations for persons from the 1977 and 1978 baselines, four
observations for the 1979 and 1980 baselines, three for the 1981 and 1982 baselines, two for the
1983 and 1984 baselines, and one for the 1985 baseline. For the B panels, we have five
obsemations for persons from the 1976 and 1977 baselines, four observations for the 1978 and
1979 baselines, three for the 1980 and 1981 baselines, two for the 1982 and 1983 baselines, and
one for the 1984 and 1985 baselines.
Although Monitoring the Future obtains information on the use of a variety of illegal
drugs, we limit the empirical analysis to cocaine for several reasons. Cocaine prices (described in
more detail in Section 111. B) are available for many more areas and are based on much larger
samples than the prices of other illegal drugs. Moreover, cocaine was the second most widely
used illegal substance next to marijuana during the sample period. While the cocaine epidemic of
the late 1970s and 1980s peaked by 1986 in Monitoring the Future (Johnston, O’Malley, and
Bachman 1994) and by 1985 in the National Household Surveys on Drug Abuse (National
Institute on Drug Abuse 199 l),s it is not clear whether these trends represent long-term
movements or cycles in the use of various illegal drugs. Some examples of cycles or new trends
in other drugs follow. The number of inmates arriving at the Rikers Island Correctional Facility in
New York City who are addicted to heroin increased by 23 percent from 1994 to 1995 (Purdy
1995). The number of high school seniors using marijuana in the past year rose by 40 percent
11between 1992 and 1994 in the Monitoring the Future baselines (Johnston, Bachman, and
O’Malley 1995). In addition, 1995 has witnessed widespread illicit use of the stimulant Ritalin on
college campuses (Leland 1995) and the sleeping pill Rohypnol in Florida (Navarro 1995). It is
probable that the demand functions for these substances have similar properties to the demand
finction for cocaine.
One problem with the Monitoring the Future panels is that persons who dropped out of
high school prior to March of their senior year are excluded. Dropouts may have different
cocaine consumption patterns than persons who remain in school, Nevertheless, the Monitoring
the Future sample is the longest nationally representative panel with information on cocaine
consumption in the age group that has the highest rate of cocaine use.
B, Cocaine Prices
Information on county identifiers at baseline and at each followup allowed us to augment
the data set with cocaine prices from the System to Retrieve Information from Drug Evidence
(STRIDE) maintained by the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) of the U.S. Department of
Justice. DEA and FBI agents and state and local police narcotics officers purchase illicit drugs on
a regular basis in order to apprehend dealers. Taubman (1991) argues that DEA agents must
make transactions at close to the street price of cocaine in order to make an arrest. because an
atypical price can cause suspicion on the part of dealers,
Information on the date and city of the purchase, its total cost, total weight in grams, and
purity (as a percentage) is recorded in STRIDE.9 There are 139 cities in STMDE with usable
data for the period from 1977 through 1991. Following DiNardo (1993), Caulkins (1994), and
12Stier and Chaloupka (1996), we obtained the price of one gram of pure cocaine by year and city
from a regression of the natural logarithm of the total purchase cost on the natural logarithm of
weight, the natural logarithm of purity, dichotomous variables for each city and year except one,
and interactions between the year variables and dichotomous variables for eight of the nine
Census of Population divisions. 10 The regression is based on over 25,000 purchases. Since
purchasers are likely to have imperfect information about purity, we treat it as endogenous and
predict it based on the other regressors just mentioned, To identi~ the model, the coeticient of
the natural logarithm of predicted purity is constrained to equal the coefficient of the natural
logarithm of weight. The price of one gram of pure cocaine is then given as the antilogarithm of
the sum of the intercept, the relevant city coefficient, and the relevant time-division coefficient,
The money price is converted to a real price by dividing it by the annual Consumer Price Index for
the U.S. as a whole (1982-1984= l).ll
Several things should be noted about the methodology just described, First, it eliminates
variations in the price or unit cost of cocaine due to variations in weight and purity. Second, the
resulting year- and city-specific price is akin to a geometric mean, Hence, the influence of outliers
is mitigated. Finally, we experimented with alternative specifications of the total cost regression.
In one specification, interactions between time and Census division were eliminated. In a second,
purity was treated as exogenous with an unconstrained coefficient, In a third, purity was deleted
as a regressor, but its predicted value was included as an independent variable in the cocaine
demand finction. The estimates presented
specifications of the total cost regression.
in Section IV are not sensitive to these alternative
13To match DEA cities to Monitoring the Future counties, we assigned each to its
Metropolitan Statistical Area, Central Metropolitan Statistical Area, or Primary Metropolitan
Statistical Area (whichever was smaller), For any county where a match could not be made, price
was defined as a population-weighted average of price in all DEA cities in that county’s state. 12
The second annual lag and the second annual lead of the real price of cocaine, which are
employed as instruments in two-stage least squares regression models, were added to the panels
in the same manner. 13 Changes of residence to a different county by panel members during the
sample period were taken into account when the prices were added,
Although our sample period includes the widespread introduction of crack cocaine in late
1985 or early 1986, we do not distinguish between the price of crack and the price of powder
cocaine. Crack’s reputation for being less expensive than powder is due primarily to the smaller
quantity at which it is retailed (Caulkins 1995). Caulkins (1996a) finds that the price per pure
gram of crack is the same as the price per pure gram of powder cocaine. Crack cocaine gives a
more intense but shorter high than powder cocaine. If quantity is defined as the product of
intensity and duration, it is not clear which type of cocaine is more or less expensive,
The national trend in our measure of the real price of one gram of pure cocaine from 1978
through 1994 is depicted in Figure 1. Prices in the last three years are based on the assumption
that the trend in our series is the same as the trend in the series constructed by Rhodes and
Pittayathikhun (1996). The current price in our empirical analysis fell by 78 percent in the sample
period of 1978 through 1987 which is used to fit the demand functions in Section IV. lJ Similar
declines have been found and discussed in detail by Kleiman (1992); Caulkins and Padman (1993);
Caulkins (1994); and Rhodes, Hyatt, and Scheiman (1994), One factor was the development of
14the production sector and the results of learning-by-doing that followed the reintroduction of
cocaine into the U. S, market in the early 1970s after a long period of absence (see below for more
details). A second was vertical integration, which reduced the number of levels in the chain of
distribution and the cost of wholesaling and retailing. Finally, there was a shift to low-cost labor
as the professionals who dealt cocaine in the 1970s were replaced by unemployed residents of
urban ghettos in the 1980s. 15
The fill price of consuming cocaine consists of three components: (1) the money price; (2)
the moneta~ value of the travel and waiting time required to obtain cocaine; and (3) the monetary
value of the expected penalties for possession or use (the probability of apprehension and
conviction multiplied by the fine or the monetary value of the prison sentence). We assume that
variations in cocaine prices among cities can be used to trace out a demand finction because they
reflect differences in the three components of the fill price among cities. Put differently, larger
transportation costs, stiffer fines and prison terms imposed on dealers, and higher probabilities of
apprehension and conviction cause the supply finction of cocaine to shifi upward and raise the
money price of cocaine. To the extent that the number of dealers in the market falls, travel and
waiting costs also rise. The fill price will also increase if the expected penalty for possession and
use is positively related to the expected penalty for selling cocaine. 16 Since the direct and indirect
price of obtaining cocaine are likely to be positively correlated, consumers may respond to
changes in money prices even if they have imperfect knowledge about these prices,
In order to support the above assumptions, we present some evidence based on an analysis
of variations in the price of cocaine among DEA cities for the year 1991. For that year, state-
specific measures of the penalties for the possession and for the manufacture, delivery, or sale of
15cocaine are available from the National Criminal Justice Association (199 1). These variables
reflect the statutory minimum and maximum dollar fines and prison terms for first offense cocaine
possession and sale. The correlation and regression results summarized below use the midpoints
of the minimum and maximum fines and prison terms, but similar results were obtained with the
mitimums or the maximums. We also included four positive correlates of the probability of
apprehension and conviction [police employment per capita, police expenditures per capita,
criminal justice employment per capita, and criminal justice expenditures per capita, all measured
at the state level and obtained from the Bureau of Justice Statistics (1992)] and one negative
correlate (the population of each city), Ehrlich (1973) argues that offenders find it relatively
easier to elude the police in densely populated areas. Population size also may reflect the
development of the cocaine market and the cost of distribution in different cities. Finally, we
identified eight cities that serve as ports of entry for cocaine from the DEA Intelligence Division
(various years): New York, Miami, Los Angeles, Houston, San Diego, New Orleans, Dallas, and
Phoenix. Due to the costs of shipping cocaine to other cities, prices should be lower in ports of
entry,
The results of the correlation and regression analysis are summarized below. Tables and a
more complete analysis are available upon request. The results should be interpreted with caution
for a variety of reasons. First, the fines and prison terms are measured at the state level rather
than at the county level. Moreover, statutory penalties may be weakly related to penalties that are
actually imposed. Resources allocated to law enforcement may be high in cities and states with
large cocaine markets and low prices. Finally, many of the variables are highly correlated and
16cannot be included in the same regressions. With these caveats in mind, findings emerge that
justifi our interpretation of the sources of price variation among areas.
(l). The prison term for cocaine sale is highly correlated with the prison term for cocaine
possession (r= 0.83). Similarly, the dollar fine for sale is highly correlated with the dollar fine for
possession (r= 0.56).
(2). The simple correlation coefficient between the real price of cocaine and the prison
term for cocaine sale and between the price and the fine for sale are positive and statistically
significant (r = 0.19 and r = 0,17, respectively), The penalty measures retain their positive signs,
although not always their significance, in the multiple regressions,
(3). Regardless of the other variables that are held constant, the relationship between
price and population is negative and significant, Price is lower in the eight port of entry cities than
in other cities with differentials ranging from approximately $6 in the case of New Orleans to S38
in the case of Miami.
(4). With population held constant, three of the four law enforcement measures are
positively related to price, and the positive coefficient of police employment is significant. The
exception pertains to criminal justice expenditures per capita.
C. Measurement of Variables
Table 1 contains definitions, means, and standard deviations of variables that are employed
in the regression analyses in Section IV, They are based on the sample of38,885 person-years or
person-followups that results by deleting persons who failed to respond to at least three
consecutive questionnaires (including baseline) and by deleting observations for which the use of
17cocaine in the past year, the real price of cocaine, and real annual earnings are missing, Given
three observations per person on average, there are approximately 12,962 respondents in the final
sample.
There are no missing values for age, male, black, and other race/ethnicity. Missing values
for the other variables listed in the table are replaced by panel- and strata-specific means, Recall
that there are two strata for each panel. One consists of persons who used marijuana daily at
baseline or used another illegal drug during the past month at baseline, and the other consists of
persons who did not exhibit these illegal drug use patterns at baseline. The means and standard
deviations in the table are weighted to correct for oversampling--by a factor of three--of persons
in the illegal drug stratum. In particular, they are weighted by the inverse of the probability of
selection, which is equivalent to multiplying values of a given variable from the illegal drug
stratum by one-third. Thus, the means and standard deviations in the table are representative of
those in the population.
Panel members report the number of occasions in the past year on which they used
cocaine. This is an ordered categorical variable with 7 outcomes: Ooccasions, 1-2 occasions, 3-5
occasions, 6-9 occasions, 10-19 occasions, 20-39 occasions, and 40 or more occasions. Since
many persons did not use cocaine in the past year, two dependent variables are considered. One
is a dichotomous variable that identifies users (termed cocaine participation),
frequency of use (number of occasions) conditional on positive participation.
and the second gives
Cocaine
participation has a weighted mean of 15.9 percent. Since the unweighed mean is 23,0 percent,
the sample of positive users contains 8,926 observations (person-years). Cocaine frequency is
18converted into a continuous variable by assigning midpoints to the closed internals and a value of
50 to the open-ended interval.
Monitoring the Future did not distinguish between the use of crack cocaine and the use of
other forms of cocaine until the 1986 baseline survey (not included in our sample) and the 1987
followup sumey. In that followup and in the 1988 and 1989 followups, two-fifihs of the
respondents were asked separate questions on crack and powder cocaine, These answers have
been aggregated to form indicators of the use of any form of cocaine and the frequency of use by
means of an algorithm developed by the Institute for Social Research.
To account for the possibility that cocaine and alcohol or cocaine and marijuana are
substitutes or complements, we include the minimum legal drinking age for the purchase and
consumption of low-alcohol beer and a dichotomous variable that identifies respondents of states
that have decriminalized the possession of marijuana. 17 Since no state has ever had a legal
drinking age greater than twenty-one, the drinking age is multiplied by a dichotomous variable
that equals one for persons twenty-one years of age or younger, In reality, since precise birth
dates are not available and respondents could have changed from illegal drinkers to legal drinkers
during the past year, the variable just mentioned takes the form of a dichotomous indicator for the
first two followups, 18
In addition to the own-state minimum legal drinking age, a dichotomous indicator equal to
one if a respondent resides in a county within 25 miles of a state with a lower legal drinking age is
employed as a regressor, This variable is equal to zero if the respondent does not live in a county
within 25 miles of another state or if the drinking age in his or her state is as low or lower than
that in nearby states. It is interacted with the dichotomous indicator for persons whose age is less
19than or equal to twenty-one for the same reason that the drinking age is interacted with this
indicator. The border age variable is included in the model to capture potential border crossings
by youths from states with high drinking ages to nearby lower age states to obtain alcohol, With
the own-state legal drinking age held constant, the coefficient of the border age variable in the
demand finction should be negative if alcohol and cocaine are substitutes (the own-legal drinking
age coefficient is positive in this case) and positive if they are complements,
Panel members are approximately age seventeen at baseline. The A panels, whose first
followup occurs one year afier baseline, are age eighteen at that followup, age twenty at the
second followup, age twenty-two at the third , age twenty-four at the fourth, and age twenty-six
at the fifih. The B panels, whose first followup occurs two years after baseline, are age nineteen
at that followup, age twenty-one at the second followup, age twenty-three at the third, age
twenty-five at the fourth, and age twenty-seven at the fifth. In the absence of precise birth dates,
the five even ages in Table 1 are dichotomous variables for the first, second, third, fourth, and
fiRh followups, respectively, for the A panels, Similarly, the four odd ages are dichotomous
variables for the first, second, third, and fourth followups, respectively, for the B panels,
In addition to the age variables just described, a variety of independent variables were
constructed from the demographic and socioeconomic information collected in the sumeys.
These include sex; race (black or other); real annual earnings;lg years of formal schooling
completed; college student status (fill-time, half-time, or less than half-time); work status (fill-
time, part-time, or unemployed);20 religious participation (infrequent or frequent); marital status
(married, engaged, or separated or divorced); and the respondent’s number of children, Finally, all
models include dichotomous variables for nine of the ten years covered by current consumption
20(1978 through 1986). The time-varying variables serve as proxies for life-cycle variables that
affect the marginal utility of current consumption.
D. Estimation Issues
Given the sharp downward trend in the real price of cocaine in Figure 1, it is worth
considering trends in cocaine participation and frequency. These trends for eighteen and nineteen
year olds are shown in Figure 2. They coincide with information reported in the first followup.
The unbalanced nature of the panel distorts trends if they are not shown on an age-specific basis.21
Twenty and twenty-one year olds do not enter the panel until 1980; twenty-two and twenty-three
year olds do not enter until 1982; twenty-four and twenty-five year olds do not enter until 1984;
and twenty-six and twenty-seven year olds do not enter until 1986. Hence, age is positively
correlated with calendar time, Eighteen and nineteen year olds are present in all years for which
we have observations on current consumption (1978-1987), Data in the figure for the years
1990-1994 were provided by the Institute for Social Research,
Participation rose from 11.8 percent in 1978 to 16.9 percent in 1982. Mer a decline to
13.8 percent in 1983, it grew to 15.9 percent in 1986 and then fell continuously afier that year.
The trend in frequency is more erratic. There was an overall peak of 9,6 occasions in 1981, but
the value in 1988 (9.5) was almost as large. In the sample period frequency grew between 1978
and 1981 and between 1982 and 1985, while it declined in 1986 and 1987,
How should these trends be taken into account in the regression models? One approach is
to omit the time dummies and to attribute the trend in consumption to the trend in price, From a
practical point of view, this amounts to omitting the age dummies as well as the time dummies,
21As indicated above,
if time is omitted.
age is a positive correlate of time, and time effects are reflected by age effects
A second approach is to employ the time dummies to capture unmeasured national
developments that may have impacted cocaine consumption. These developments include the
“just say no” to drugs campaign begun by Nancy Reagan shortly after Ronald Reagan became
President in 1981, efforts by the Partnership for a Drug-Free America to publicize the harmfil
effects of cocaine, and the dramatic cocaine-related deaths in June 1986 of the basketball star Len
Bias and the football star Don Rogers. They also include the increase in resources devoted to
interdiction and criminal justice as part of the Federal War on Drugs and the introduction and
difision of mandatory drug testing in a variety of settings.
One can argue, perhaps in hindsight, that the hazards of cocaine have been recognized
a long time. Cocaine use was fairly widespread in the U. S. from the late 1880s until the early
for
1900s when many states enacted criminal prohibitions. This process culminated in a Federal ban
under the 1914 Harrison Act (Musto 1973), and the drug virtually disappeared from use until the
early 1970s. Apparently, so did the knowledge about the harm that it can do, In August 1974
Dr. Peter Boume, who later served as President Jimmy Carter’s science advisor, stated: “Cocaine,
once a component of many tonics and of Coca-Cola, is probably the most benign of illicit drugs
currently in widespread use. The number of people seeking treatment as a result of cocaine use is
for all practical purposes zero (quoted by Kerr 1986, p. B6).” In the 1980 edition of the
Comprehensive Textbook of Psvchiatw, the main psychiatric textbook in the U. S., Dr. Lester
Grinspoon and James B. Bakalar wrote: “If it is used no more than two or three times a week,
cocaine creates no serious problems .,. At present, chronic cocaine use does not usually appear as
22a medical problem (pp. 1621-1622).” Given these statements and the developments summarized
above, our preferred specification includes the time and age dummies. We do, however, indicate
how the results are altered when these variables are omitted.
We estimate separate equations for participation and for frequency given positive
participation. This is an application of Cragg’s (1971) model for an outcome (cocaine
consumption) with many nonparticipants or zero values. We prefer it to Heckman’s (1979)
sample selection procedure because the latter pertains to a situation where the use of cocaine is
not observed for some individuals, In our case this variable is observed and equal to zero for
nonparticipants. 22
Given the nature of the panels, we estimate the participation version of equation (2) with
the second lag of participation as the measure of past consumption and the second lead of
participation as the measure of fiture consumption. Similarly, we estimate the equation for
frequency conditional on positive use with the second lag of frequency as the measure of past
consumption and the second lead of frequency as the measure of fiture consumption, 23 Since
past consumption and
least squares (TSLS).
future consumption are endogenous, the equation is fitted by two-stage
The instruments consist of the exogenous variables in the model, the
second lag of the annual real cocaine price, the second lead of the annual real cocaine price, the
second annual lag and lead of the marijuana decriminalization indicator, the second annual lags of
the two measures pertaining to the legal drinking age (legal drinking age*age<21 and lower
border drinking age indicator*age<21 ), and the second leads and the second lags of all time-
varying socioeconomic vanables.24 These include real annual earnings, years of formal schooling
completed, college student status, work status, religious participation, marital status, and number
23of children. The second leads of the two measures pertaining to the legal drinking age are not
used as instruments because the values of these two variables are zero except at the first followup.
The second leads and second lags of all time-varying socioeconomic variables are valid
instruments for reasons given in Section II.
At the first followup, second lags of socioeconomic variables pertain to baseline data. For
this followup, the second lag of years of formal schooling completed equals 11 for all
respondents, and the second lags of the fill-time, half-time, and less than half-time college student
status indicators all are equal to zero, The second lag of work status is taken from a baseline
question on average hours of work per week during the school year.25 High school seniors who
do not work at all during the school year are assumed to be not in the labor force rather than
unemployed. The second lag of earnings as of the first followup equals the sum of income from
work during the school year and other sources such as allowances and summer jobs,2G
Linear probability models for participation and linear models for frequency given
participation are obtained. The two-stage least squares participation equations correspond to
Heckman and MaCurdy’s (1985) simultaneous equations linear probability model. Frequently,
Cragg’s model is estimated by taking a logarithmic transformation of use conditional on positive
use. We avoid this since the quadratic utility finction, which is the most simple form in the
context of addiction, generates a linear demand function,
In interpreting the estimates in Section IV, one should bear in mind that both cocaine use
and price are subject to measurement error. Cocaine frequency is measured with error because of
the open-ended frequency category of 40 or more occasions in the past year. Clearly, the
magnitudes of the elasticities may be affected by the number of occasions assigned to this
24category. Thus, it is more important to focus on the relative magnitudes of the elasticities (the
long-run relative to the short-run or relative to the temporary) than on the absolute magnitudes of
the elasticities.
Cocaine use also is measured inaccurately if self-reports are subject to response error.
The validity and reliability of self-reported illegal drug use data in the Michigan surveys have been
examined by Johnston, O’Malley, and Bachman a number of times (for example, 1994). They
conclude that the data have very high degrees of validity and reliability. In a related area, the
implications of response error in self-reported alcohol use for the estimation of alcohol demand
finctions are considered in detail by Grossman, Coate, and Arluck (1987) and by Coate and
Grossman (1988). They conclude that computed price effects are unbiased or conservative
lower-bound estimates under a variety of alternative assumptions.
The real price of cocaine contains measurement error for several reasons. First, the price
data pertain to the DEA survey city nearest to the respondent’s county of residence rather than to
the city or town in which the respondent actually resides, Second, the respondent may have
imperfect information concerning the market price and the quality (purity) of the purchase, which
creates a difference between this price and the perceived price that governs his or her
consumption. Third, the fiture price employed assumes that respondents who moved filly
anticipated the move. Random measurement error in an independent variable biases its coefficient
and t-ratio toward zero, Thus, the price coefficients and associated t-ratios in Section IV are
conservative lower-bound estimates.27
Despite the oversampling of illegal drug users in the past month at baseline, unweighed
regressions are obtained. Maddala (1983, pp. 170-171) shows that this is the appropriate
25procedure in the case of exogenous stratification (oversampling on the basis of an exogenous
variable in a regression model). In particular, if wj is the inverse of the sampling fraction for the
jth stratum, there is no justification for a weighted least squares procedure in which (wj)l’2 is the
weight. The reason is that in regression analysis weighting is employed to produce efficient
estimates rather than to produce consistent estimates. There is no reason why the drawing of
non-equiproportionate samples from different strata should introduce heteroscedasticity such that
the residual variance is s2/wj, where S*is a constant.
Maddala (1983, pp. 171-173) also shows that it
case of endogenous stratification (oversampling on the
is appropriate to weight by (wj)l’2 in the
basis of the depencient variable in a
regression model). In our case, the oversampling is based on a variable--illegal drug use in the
past month at baseline--that does not enter the regression model as a dependent or independent
variable, Perhaps an argument could be made for weighting because this variable is positively
related to current annual cocaine participation or frequency. But Maddala’s model assumes that
slope coefficients are the same in the two strata. For large enough samples, this could be
investigated by obtaining separate regressions for each stratum,28 But the stratum generated by
persons who used illegal drugs at baseline does not account for a sufficient percentage of cases
(person-years) to obtain reliable parameter estimates.
Our preferred strategy is to pool the two strata and fit unweighed regressions. The
resulting coefficients essentially are averages for the two strata. This is the strategy suggested by
DuMouchel and Duncan (1983). They show that weighted regressions are not appropriate in a
stratified sample if the linear homoscedastic model is correct or if averages of strata-specific
regression coefficients are desired, We did, however, experiment with weighted regressions and
26found that they were very similar to the unweighed estimates in Section IV. This statement
pertains to coefficients, standard errors, and elasticities. Note that the difference between the
weighted and the unweighed frequency of use in the sample of positive cocaine users is small:
(9.20 occasions versus 10.23 occasions).
IV. Em~irical Results
Tables 2 and 3 test the rational addiction model of cocaine consumption by estimating
structural demand finctions given by equation (2) for cocaine participation (Table 2) and for
frequency of cocaine use given positive participation (Table 3). The first two columns of each
table contain two-stage least squares (TSLS) regressions in which past and fiture participation or
past and fiture frequency are endogenous. In the first column the legal drinking age, the border
drinking age indicator, and the marijuana decriminalization measure are omitted, while in the
second column they are included. Columns three and four contain the corresponding ordinary
least squares regressions, The tables also contain chi-squared statistics resulting from Hausman’s
(1978) test of the hypothesis that OLS estimates are consistent,
With two degrees of freedom, the critical chi-squared values are 5.99 at the 5 percent level
and 9,21 at the 1 percent level. Since the computed values always are smaller than these critical
values, the consistency of the OLS estimates is accepted. Nevertheless, it is usefil to consider all
the estimates in the two tables because they are similar and because the consistency of OLS is
rejected in some of the alternative specifications discussed later.
The estimated effects of past and fiture participation on current participation are
significantly positive in the four regressions in Table 2, and the estimated cocaine price effects are
27significantly negative. The same comments apply to the past frequency, fiture frequency, and
cocaine price coefficients in the four regressions in Table 3. The positive and significant past
participation or past frequency coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis that cocaine
consumption is an addictive good. The positive and significant fiture participation or fiture
frequency coefficient is consistent with the hypothesis of rational addiction and inconsistent with
the hypothesis of myopic addiction. The sum of the past and fiture participation or frequency
coefficients is always smaller than one. This means that the long-inn, short-run, and temporary
price effects, which are discussed in more detail below, are negative. The stability of these results
across alternative outcomes, specifications, and estimation methods is quite impressive.
Clearly, the estimates indicate that cocaine consumption is addictive in the sense that past
and fiture changes significantly impact current consumption. The evidence is inconsistent with
the hypothesis that cocaine consumers are myopic, Moreover, based on the frequency demand
finctions, three of the four estimates of the implied discount factor (~)--given by the ratio of the
coefficient of fiture consumption to the coefficient of past consumption--are quite reasonable,
The discount factor is 0.90 in the first regression in Table 3, 1.03 in the second regression, and
0.96 in the third and fourth regressions, The first discount factor corresponds to an interest rate
of 11 percent, while the last two correspond to an interest rate of 4 percent, The second gives a
negative interest rate of-3 percent. The same computations applied to the participation equations
yield discount factors ranging from 1.19 to 1,08 and negative interest rates ranging from -16
percent to -7 percent. These results are not filly consistent with rational addiction.29
We imposed a discount factor of 0.95 (interest rate of 5 percent) a priori and reestimated
the eight regressions in Tables 2 and 3, The price coefficients in these models are extremely close
28to their unconstrained counterparts. These results, combined with the detailed analysis in Becker,
Grossm~ and Murphy (1994) and in Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1996) suggest that
data on cocaine, cigarette, or alcohol consumption may not be rich enough to pin down the
discount factor with precision even if the rational addiction model is accepted.
Table 4 uses the estimates horn Tables 2 and 3 to compute the elasticity of participation
(Panel A) or the elasticity of frequency given positive participation (Panel B) with respect to the
various price changes defined in Section II at the weighted sample means of price, participation,
and frequency [see equations (4a-c), (5), and (6)]. Panel C of Table 4 contains unconditional
price elasticities defined as the sum of the relevant participation and frequency elasticities, The
long-inn participation price elasticity is substantial. It ranges from -1.26 to -1.56 with a mean of
-1.40. The short-run participation price elasticity ranges from -0.68 to -0.80 (average equals
-0.73). Thus, the average long-run participation elasticity is approximately twice as large as the
short-run elasticity.
Frequency conditional on positive use is not as sensitive to price as participation. The
average long-run elasticity is -0.47, and the average short-run elasticity is -0.33. The
unconditional price elasticities are quite large: -1,87 on average in the long run and -1.06 on
average in the short run. The ratio of the long-run elasticity to the short-run elasticity of 1,76
should be compared to a ratio of approximately 1.91 in the case of cigarettes (Becker, Grossman
and Murphy 1994) and 1.60 in the case of alcohol (Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan 1996).
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (199 1) show that the ratio of the Iong-mn price elasticity to the
short-run price elasticity rises as the degree of addiction, measured by the coeticient of past
consumption, rises. Hence, our results suggest that cocaine is less addictive than cigarette
29smoking but more addictive than alcohol consumption. There is no consensus in the
pharmacological literature concerning the ranking in terms of addiction of these three substances.
But our results are consistent with some of the evidence presented in this literature (Kozlowski,
Wilkinson; Skimer, Kent, Franklin, and Pope 1989; Hemingfield, Clayton, and Pollin 1990;
Henningfield, Cohen, and Slade 199 1).
With regard to the tempora~ price elasticities, a 10 percent reduction in the current price
causes the number of cocaine users to increase by approximately 3.4 percent and causes the
frequency of use to rise by approximately 2.4 percent. A 10 percent reduction in current price
also leads to a 1.6 percent increase in participation next year and a 1,8 increase in participation
last year, Finally, the frequency of use next year rises by 0.7 percent, and the frequency of use last
year also rises by 0.7 percent, These negative cross price effects are inconsistent with
nonaddictive behavior, and the negative fiture price effect is inconsistent with myopic behavior.
There is some evidence in Tables 2 and 3 that cocaine and marijuana are complements in
consumption, while cocaine and alcohol are substitutes. Both cocaine participation and frequency
are higher in states that decriminalized marijuana than in other states, although the frequency
coefficients are not statistically significant. Another interpretation of this finding is that the
expected penalty for cocaine use is smaller in states that decriminalized marijuana. An increase in
the legal drinking age raises cocaine participation and use, although again the frequency effects
are not significant. Although the coefficient of the lower border age drinking indicator has the
wrong sign, the sign and significance of the drinking age coefficient itself are not altered when the
border age measure is deleted. But the conclusion that cocaine and alcohol are substitutes must be
30tempered because states with higher drinking ages may allocate more resources to enforcement of
drinking age laws and less resources to apprehending and convicting cocaine users and dealers.
The last finding we wish to note is the positive effect of real earnings on participation and
frequency. Although the participation coefficients are not significant at conventional levels, the
frequency coefficients all have t-ratios in excess of three. The long-inn e~mings elasticity of
participation equals 0.11 in the four models in Table 2, and the Iong-mn earnings elasticity of
frequency falls between 0.14 and 0.22 in the four models in Table 3. The long-run unconditional
earnings elasticity ranges from 0.25 to 0.33.
In Table 5 we examine the sensitivity of the price and consumption effects to the omission
of the time and age variables. Age is omitted because it is strongly correlated with calendar time
(see Section 111for more details). Since the legal drinking age has a sharp upward trend, the
models that include it are not part of the sensitivity analysis.
In a qualitative sense, the results in Table 5 are consistent with those in Tables 2 and 3.
The past and fiture consumption coefficients are positive and significant, and the current price
coefficients are negative and significant. The price elasticities are, however, smaller. 30 Based on
averages of the two models estimated, the unconditional price elasticity is -0.82 in the long run,
-0.46 in the short run, and -0.26 for a temporary current price change. Each of these elasticities is
approximately two-fifihs as large as the corresponding elasticity in the model that control for age
and time (-1. 87, -1.06, and -0,57, respectively).
In Table 6 we examine the robustness of the price and consumption effects by estimating
two-stage least squares fixed-effects models, Using this technique, we transform all time-varying
variables into deviations from person-specific means and delete time-invariant variables and cases
31where there is only one observation for a given person from the regression. This approach is
equivalent to including a dummy variable for each person in an untransformed specification and
controls for unobsemed heterogeneity.31 Since the Hausman tests strongly reject the consistency
of OLS, only the TSLS coefficients are presented in the table.32
On the whole, the results in Table 6 cofirm those in Tables 2 and 3. The past and fiture
consumption coefficients are positive and significant, The current price coefficients are negative,
although the frequency effects are not significant. The average long-run unconditional elasticity
of-O. 83 is smaller than the one in Table 4 but almost exactly equal to the one in Table 5, The
average short-run and temporary price elasticities (-0.62 and -0.42, respectively) are bigger than
those in Table 5 but smaller than those in Table 4.
Which of the three sets of estimates are preferable? The specification in Table 4 is based
on the questionable assumption that information about the harmful effects of cocaine was filly
diffised at the beginning of our sample period (1978) and that the various anti-dreg campaigns in
the 1980s had no impact on the use of cocaine, As pointed out in Section 111.D,the real price of
cocaine contains random measurement error for a variety of reasons. The downward biases in the
price coefficient and its t-ratio due to this factor are exacerbated in the fixed-effects model in
Table 6 (Griliches 1979; Griliches and Hausman
not necessarily superior to those in Tables 2 and
1986). Thus the estimates in Tables 5 and 6 are
3, Taken together, however, the four tables
underscore the stability and validity of our findings. Despite our misgivings about the fixed
effects model and the model that ignores time trends, we summarize the magnitudes of the price
elasticities by averaging over the three models. This gives a long-run unconditional price
elasticity of- 1.18, a short-run price elasticity of-O.71, and a temporary current price elasticity of
32-0.42. We view these figures as consemative lower-bound estimates,
V, Discussion
We find that cocaine consumption is quite sensitive to its price, A permanent 10 percent
reduction in price would cause the number of cocaine users to grow by slightly more than 8
percent in the long run and would increase the frequency of use among users by a little more than
3 percent. Total or unconditional frequency would rise by almost 12 percent in a fixed
population in the long run and by almost 7 percent in the short run. Surely, both proponents and
opponents of drug legalization should take account of this increase in consumption in debating
their respective positions.
A good deal of caution, however, must be exercised in extrapolating our findings to a
regime in which cocaine consumption is legal. One consideration is that the response to the large
price cut caused by legalization would be smaller than the one suggested by our estimates if the
price elasticity of demand is smaller at lower prices. A second consideration is that government
tax policies could counteract part of the price cut, and government education policies could be
used to increase knowledge about the harmfil effects of cocaine consumption. A third factor is
that “forbidden fruit is attractive, particularly to the young (Friedman 1989, p. Al 6).” A factor
that goes in the opposite direction is that legalization may stimulate consumption by removing the
stigma associated with cocaine consumption.
A misleading impression about the reaction to permanent price changes may have been
created by the effects of temporary police crackdowns on drugs or temporary federal “wars” on
drugs. Since temporary policies raise current but not fiture prices (they would even lower fiture
33prices if drug inventories are built up during the crackdown period), there is no complementary
fall in current use from a fall in fiture use. Consequently, even if drug addicts are rational, a
temporary war that greatly raised the street price of cocaine may well only have a small effect on
drug use, whereas a permanent war could have much bigger effects. For example, according to
our estimates, a 10 percent price hike for one year would reduce total cocaine consumption by
approximately 4 percent, whereas a permanent 10 percent price hike would lower consumption by
12 percent.
Clearly, we have not provided enough evidence to evaluate whether or not the use of
cocaine should be legalized, A cost-benefit analysis of many effects is needed to decide between a
regime in which cotiaine is legal and a regime in which it is not, What we have shown is that the
permanent reduction in price caused by legalization is likely to have a substantial positive effect on
use, particularly among young adults.
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1See Reuter and Kleiman (1986), Kaplan (1988), Tregarthen (1989), and Kleiman (1992)
for rough estimates of these reductions.
2 See Grossman (1993) for a summa~ of this research.
3This maybe traced to attempts to fit the rational addiction model to relatively short time
series of aggregate data.
4Dealers may be less sensitive to price than non-dealers because an increase in price raises
the real income of the former group, while it lowers the real income of the latter group. Hence, if
heroin is a superior good, the substitution and income effects of a price reduction go in opposite
directions for dealers.
5Equation(1) assumes that the rate of depreciation on the addictive stock is equal to one,
so that the stock is replaced by lagged consumption (Cl-l) in the current period utility finction.
Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1996) report that empirical results for a model with a rate of
depreciation smaller than one are ve~ similar to those for a model with a rate of depreciation
equal to one in the case of alcohol. Equation (1) also assumes no uncertainty about becoming
addicted. For an analysis that alters this assumption without changing the basic predictions of the
rational addiction model, see Orphanides and Zervos (1995).
bThere is no odd-numbered calendar year panel from the 1976 baseline survey.
447For the A panels, the first value of past consumption@ coincides with the first annual
lag of consumption. The same comment applies to lagged values of socioeconomic
characteristics, the price of cocaine, and related variables which are discussed below, From now
on, we refer to the past value of a given variable as its second lag even though the first past value
is the first lag for the A panels. In prelimina~ estimation, we found that results obtained for the B
panels only were ve~ similar to those reported in Section IV.
s Trends in the National Households Surveys on Drug Abuse between
based on surveys taken in 1976, 1977, 1979, 1982, 1985, 1988, and 1990.
976 and 1990 are
9Weight and purity are measured in DEA laboratories, STRIDE is described in detail by
Frank (1987), DiNardo (1993), andCaulkins(1994),
10Missing data for some cities in certain years preclude a specification with city-time or
state-time interactions.
11We also experimented with deflation by a city-specific cost of living index multiplied by
the amual CPI for the U. S. as a whole. The city index is the one reported by the American
Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association (ACCRA various years) and described in detail
by Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1996). Preliminary results with this price variable were
similar to those contained in Section IV. We do not emphasize estimates with it because in many
cases an ACCW city must be matched to a different DEA city,
12Except in two cases, the price from one state was never assigned to residents of another
state. The Washington, D,C. MSA includes portions of Virginia and Maryland. Those living
within this MSA were given the D,C. price even if they lived in Virginia or Maryland. The Kansas
City, Kansas-Kansas City, Missouri MSA includes residents of two states. The DEA city pertains
45to Missouri. All residents of the MSA were given the same price since neither state is the
dominant one in the population of the MSA. Although St. Louis, Missouri also is a DEA city,
residents of Kansas City, Missouri were not assigned a state-weighted average price because the
distance between the two cities is very large.
13Recall that the first value of lagged price is the first annual lag for the A panels, In
additio~ for the B panel from the 1976 baseline, the first value of lagged price pertains to 1977
since there are no cocaine prices prior to that year,
14In an accounting sense, the decline in price between 1978 and 1987 can be traced to a
large increase in purity from 32 percent in the former year to 73 percent in the latter year and to a
modest 12 percent decline in the money price of one gram of cocaine not adjusted for purity at the
same time as the Consumer Price Index rose by 75 percent.
15Much of the above discussion is based on a personal conversation with Jonathan P,
Caulkins.
lbIf the supply curve of cocaine slopes upward and the expected penalties for use and
distribution are positively related, the positive correlation between the money price and the fill
price is reduced but not eliminated. Lee (1993) reaches somewhat different conclusions than
those in the text, but he assumes an upward-sloping supply curve and a Cobb-Douglas utility
finction, Moreover, he holds the expected penalty per contact with users imposed on dealers
constant. In the context of our analysis, if the expected penalty imposed on users (f) is
proportional to the money price of cocaine and the supply finction is infinitely elastic, the price
elasticity of demand is not biased by the omission off To see this, define fill price (n) as the sum
46of money price (p) and ~ and let f= kp, where k is a constant. If the demand finction is linear, it
can be written as
c=a-~n=a-~(l+k)p.
The elasticity of c with respect to n is
e = ~7KC-1= ~p(l + k)c-’.
Along the same lines, one can show that the elasticity of c with respect to p is smaller than the
elasticity of c with respect to n if f = a + kp, a >0 or if f = kpY,y <1. For y > 1 the money price
elasticity exceeds the fill price elasticity.
17DiNardo and Lemieux (1992) report that an increase in the legal drinking age increases
the percentage of high school seniors who used marijuana in the past month, They also find that
the percentage of high school seniors who used alcohol in the past month is lower in states that
decriminalized marijuana. Decriminalization, however, has no impact on the use of marijuana.
These findings are based on the time series of state cross sections used by DiNardo (1993) and
described in Section 1, Using individual observations from the 1989 Monitoring the Future
baseline surveys, Chaloupka and Laixuthai (1994) indicate that monthly or annual alcohol
consumption is lower in states that decriminalized marijuana and is positively related to the money
price of marijuana. They do not study marijuana consumption and their marijuana price is taken
from a DEA source other than STRIDE that contains data for 19 cities in 16 states, Taken
together, the two studies suggest that marijuana and alcohol are substitutes.
18The construction of this variable accounts for the grandfather clauses many states
adopted when raising their legal ages for all alcoholic beverages to 21 years to comply with the
Federal Uniform Drinking Age Act of 1984. Similar variables were constructed for high alcohol
47beer and for distilled spirits. The three series are extremely highly correlated, and the choice of
the drinking age variable has little impact on the resulting estimates. For more details on the
construction of the drinking age measure, see Chaloupka, Saffer, and Grossman (1993).
19Money earnings are deflated by a city-specific cost-of living-index multiplied by the
annual CPI for the U.S. as a whole. The city index is the one reported by the ACCRA (see note
11 and Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan 1996).
20Full-time work status and fill-time college student status are not mutually exclusive
categories in theory or in the followup questionnaires.
21The regressions presented in Section IV do not include age-time interactions because
these interactions are not significant as a set, But this is in the context of a specification that
controls for past and fiture consumption,
22For detailed discussions of the Cragg and Heckman procedures, see Lin and Schmidt
(1984) and Manning, Duan, and Rogers (1987). The latter authors refer to Cragg’s model as the
two-part model.
23The sample of positive current users includes persons whose past or fiture values of use
can be zero. In fact, the weighted means of past and fiture participation are 64 percent and 69
percent, respectively.
24In some specifications the current legal drinking age and marijuana decriminalization
measures are omitted from the demand finctions, In these specifications the past values of the
drinking age variables and the past and fiture values of the decriminalization indicator are not
employed as instruments.
4825Full-time workers at baseline are students who work more than 20 hours per week
during the school year.
26The only income question in the followup surveys pertains to own earnings
27Kloek(198 1) and Moulton (1990) argue that t-ratios of coefficients of aggregate
variables in micro regressions are biased downward if the disturbances in the regression are
correlated among persons who live in the same area, This assumes, however, that the aggregate
variable is measured without error. Another mitigating factor is that Kloek (1981) shows that the
bias in the t-ratios increases as the number of people in each group (in our case, the county) rises,
We have a small number of observations from a given county. A related issue pertains to the
effects of the panel nature of the sample on standard errors of regression coefficients. In
particular, the disturbance terms for a given person are likely to be correlated over time.
Grossman, Chaloupka, and Sirtalan (1996) find that Huber (1967) standard errors, which take
account of these correlations, are no larger than uncorrected standard errors in their study of
rational addiction demand finctions for alcohol in the Monitoring the Future panels.
2sThese estimates would have to be corrected for sample selection using Heckman’s
(1979) methodology. Identification by means other than the nonlinear relationship between the
inverse of the Mills ratio and the regressors is highly problematic.
29Strictly speaking, equation (2) in the text pertains to a continuous outcome. Therefore,
the estimates in Table 2 and their implied discount factors should be viewed as first-order
approximations.
30The participation elasticities in the first model in Table 5 are smaller than the
corresponding elasticities in Table 4, even though the price and consumption coefficients in the
49two models appear to be very similar. Indeed the price coefficients appear to be identical. They
are very small numbers (.000 1 in absolute value to four decimal places). But the computation of
the elasticities uses more than four decimal places.
31If individuals did not move among counties, the fixed-effect specification would filly
control for unmeasured county-specific factors since county dichotomous variables would be
time-invariant. Along the same lines, if persons move among counties but not among states,
unmeasured state-specific factors are eliminated, More generally, the fixed-effects model reduces
biases due to unmeasured area-specific forces,
32Although the models in Table 6 contain the same time-varying regressors as the models
in Tables 2 and 3, it is not surprising that the Hausman test decisively rejects OLS in Table 6 but
not in Tables 2 and 3. Nickell (1981) shows that fixed-effects OLS estimation produces a
negative bias and inconsistency in the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable in the absence
of serial correlation. Using his techniques, one can demonstrate that the coefficients of past and
fiture consumption are understated in the OLS fixed-effects model. Indeed, we obtain negative





















Cocaine Participation and Frequency Given Positive Participation,












Cocaine pticipation Dichotomousvariable that equals 1 if respondent
(O. 159,0.320) used cocaine at least once in the pmt year
Cocaine frequencygivenpositiveparticipation Number of occasions in past year on which
(9.195,8.963) respondent used cocaine
Price Price of one pure gram of cocaine in 1982-84
(286.557, [17.204) dollarsD
Legal ming age*ageQ 1 Minimum legal age in years for
(12.093, 8409) purchase and consumption of beer,
alcoholic content 3,2 percent or
less (legal tiing age); multiplied
by a dichotomous variable that equals
1 if respondentis21 years of age or
younger (age~ 1)b























Dichotomous variable that equals I if
respondent resides in a county within
25 miles of a state with a lower
legal tiing age (lower border age
indicator); multiplied by a
dichotomous variable that equals 1 if
respondent is 21 years of age or younger
Dichotomous variable that equals 1 if responden[
resides in a state in which incarceration and hea~
times are not penalties for most marijuana possession
offenses
Dichotomous variables that identifi
respondents aged 18, 19, 20, 21, 22,
23, 24, 25, and 26 respectively; omitted




Black Dichotomous variables that identifi
(0.09 1,0.252) Aho-Americans or blacks (Black) and
Other race/ethnicity American tndians, Puerto Ricans or
(0.068, 0.22 1) other Latin Americans, Mexican
Americans or Chicanos, or Orientals
or Asian Americans (Other
race/etiicity); omitted catego~
pertains to Caucasians or whites
Real earnings
(7.447.845. 5.880.433)
























Real earnings in the pmt calendar
year in 1982-84 dollars; money
earnings divided by a year- and
city-specific cost of living index
Years of formal schooling completed
Dichotomous indicators; omitted
catego~ pertains to persons not
attending school in Mmch of the
survey year
Dichotomous indicators that pefiain
to fust fill week of March of the
survey year: omitted category
identifies respondents not in
the labor force
Dichotomous variables that identi@
respondents who rarely attend
religious services (infrequent
religious participation) and who
artend religious services at least
once or twice a month (frequent
religious participation),
respectively; omitted category
pertains to respondents who never
attend religious services
Dichotomous indicators; omitted
category pertains to single
respondentsTable 1 (Continued)




















Dichotomous variables for followups conducted in
years specified; omitted year is 1987
‘Means and standard deviations in parentheses. First figure is mean, second figure is standard deviation.
Yleans and s[andard deviations are weighted by the tiverse of the probability of selection; equivalent to multiplying
values of a given variable from the illegal drug stratum by one-third. Sample size is 38.885 &xcept for cocaine
frequency given positive participation where the sample size is 8.926.




Two-Stage LeastSquares Ordinary LeastSquares
(1) (2) (3) (4) I
Price -0,0001 -0.000 [ -0.0002 -0.0002
(-5.22) (-4,63) (-6.70) (-5,86)
Put ~artici~ation 0,381 0.381 0.378 0.377 .,
(9.92) (10.09) (86.10) (85.93)
Future ptiicipation 0,452 0.449 0.408 0,40s
(14,17) (14,16) (95.46) (95.38)
Marijuana decriminalization 0.008 0.008
(2.13) (~.~9)
Legal drinking age*age <2 I 0.004 0.004
(2,36) (2.55)
Lower border drinking age indicator* age s 21 0,008 0.010
(1.48) (1.89) ~
Age 18 I -0.044 -0.130 -0.047 -().139 I
(-3.58) (-3.40) I (-4.0[)
,4ge 19
(-374) I




-0.008 -0.093 -0.o1o -0.101
(-0.69) (-2.46) (-0.87) (-2.73)
Age 2 I 0.000 -0.086 -0.002 -0093
(-0.03) (-~,~8) (-0.15) (-2.52) I
.Age 2? 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.008 I
(0,89) (0.85) (0.80) (0.76) ~
.Aee 23 I 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 ~
(0,56) (0.52) (0.55) (0.51)
Age 24 0.002 0.002 ().002 0.002
(0,22) (0.20) (0.16) (0.15)
Aee 25 0,002 0,002 0.002 0002 I
(0.22) (0.21) (0.20) (0.19) ~
,\ge 26 -(),023 (),001 -0.023 -0.023 I
(-[ .84) (0.31) (-1.s5) (-1.s4) ~
.Male 0.001 -0,023 0.004 (),U04 I
I (0.24) I (-1.83) I (1.lo) I ~1.15) II
(-3,74) (-3,58) (-4.68) (-4.45) !
Other racelethnicity -0.008 -0,009 -0.009 -().010 ‘
(-1.33) (-[.52) (-1.47) (-[.67)
Real earnings 0,0000004 0,0000004 ().0000005 0.0000005
I (1.42) (1.47) (1.57) (1.63)
Years of completed schooling 0,000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 I
(-0.07) (-(),11) (-0.41) (-0.43)
Full-time college student -0,007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008
(-l ,44) (-[,46) (-1.54) (-1.57) 1
Half-time college student 0,002 0,002 0.003 0,002
(0.23) (0.20) (0.3 1) (0.27)
Less than half-time college student -0.003 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(-0,46) (-0,51) (-0.41) (-0.46)
Working full-time -0,002 -(),002 -().002 -0.002
(-0,36) (-0.37) (-0.47) (-0.48)
Working part-time -0,00 I -0.001 -0.00 I -0.001
(-0.21) (-0.25) (-0.27) (-0.30)
55Table 2 (continued)
Unemployed 0,013 0,013 0,014 0.013
([.38) (1.35) (1,45) (1.41)
Infrequent religious participation -0,013 -0.012 -0.0[4 -0.014
, (-2.44) (-2.38) (-2.73) (-2,66)
Frequent religious participation -0.053 -0.052 -0.062 -0.06 [
(-7.23) (-7.24) (-11,79) (-11.63)
Married -0.050 -0.050 -0.056 -0.056
(-9. 16) (-9.18) (-12.25) (-[2. L7)
Engaged -0,011 -0,011 -0.014 -0.013
(-1.83) (-1,84) (-2,39) (-2.36)
Sepmated or divorced -0.002 -0,002 -0,003 -0.002
(-0,21) (-0,18) (-0,26) (-0,23)
Number of children -0,008 -0.008 -0,008 -0.008
(-2.25) (-2.23) (-2.39) (-2.37)
1978 0.067 0.067 0.080 0.081
(4.01) (3.93) (5.24) (5. [3)
I979 0,089 0.090 0.103 ().103
(5.72) (5.60) (7 24) (7,08)
1980 0.070 0,070 0.081 0,081 ~
(5.70) (5.61) (7,45) (7.29)
[981 0.050 0,050 0.060 0.060
(4.53) (4.48) (6.28) (6.16)
1982 ().046 0.045 0.054 0054
(4.S2) (4,72) (6.50) (6.33)
I983 0,030 0.030 0.038 0038
(3,38) (3.34) (5.02) (4.92)
1984 0,026 0.026 0.033 ().032
(3.50) (3.42) (4,90) (4.76)
i
1985 0.054 0.054 0.059 0.058 i
(777) (7.68) (8.93) (8.80) )
1986 0.043 (),043 0.045 0.045
(7.20) (7. L7) (7.84) (7.79)
R-squared ().179 0.181 0,486 ().486
Hausman chi-squared 4,165 3,815
Y 38.885 38.885 38.885 38.885




Two-Stage LeastSquares Ordinary LeastSquares
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Price -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.005
(-3.29) (-3.13) (-2.99) (-2.51)
Past frequency 0.247 o~lg 0.314 0.313
(2.74) (2.51) (29.61) (29.56)
Future frequency 0,223 f),~~j 0.302 0,302
[3,92) (3.95) (3 1,96) (31,94)
Mwijuana decriminalization 0.250 0,203
(0.89) (0.75)
Legal drinking age*age <21 0,149 0.144
( [,03) (1.00)
Lower border drinking age indicator* age <21 0,455 o~83
(1.03) (0.66)
Age 18 -1.840 -5.187 -1,070 -4.046
(-1.47) (-1.59) (-1,07) (-1.31)
Age I 9 -0.911 -4.?82 -0,071 -3.035
(-O.71) (-1.31) (-().08) (-(),99)
Age 20 -0.856 -4,166 -(),182 -3.132
(-0.72) (-1.30) (-0,20) (-1.03)
Age 21 -1,015 -4.303 -0,428 -;.376
(-0,90) (-1.35) (-0,47) (-1.11)
Age 22 -0.563 -0.754 -0,039 -().065
(-0,53) (-[).71) (-0.04) (-007)
Age ~~ -0,695 -0,848 -0.331 -0.353
(-0.69) (-0,s5) (-0.37) (-0.39)
Age 24 -0.171 ‘ -0.275 0,200 0.18s
(-O.17) (-0,2s) (0.22) (0.20)
Age 25 -0,102 -0,216 0.229 (),226
(-0.10) (-0.22) (().25) (0.24)
Age 26 -2.250 -~.316 -1,97[ -1973
(-2.03) (-2.08) (-1.82) (-182)
Vlaie -0.348 -0.336 -0,456 -0.452
(- I.31) (-1.26) (-[.79)
Black
(-1.77)
-1.21s .l~so -1,019 -1.005
(-1.s5) (-1.95) (-1.67) (-1.64)
Other racejethnlci~ 0.569 0.533 0,58S 0.557
(1,18) (1.10) (1,23) (1.16)
Real earnings 0.0001 0.0001 0,ooo1 0.0001
(3.55) (3.59) (3,35) (3.35)
Years of completed schooling -0.356 -0.366 -0,258 -().257
(-3.04) (-313) (-2,52) (-2.51)
Full-time college student -1.30[ -1.324 -1.190 -1. [99
(-3.30) (-3.34) (-3,08) (-3 [0)
Half-time college student -1.134 -1,132 -1, [s2 -1.191
(- I.77) (-1.76) (- 1.S6) (-1.s8)
Less than half-time college student -1.045 -1.037 -1,057 -1.075
(-1,94) (-1.92) (-2,02) (-2.05)
Working full-time -0.503 -0.532 -().363 -().362
(-1,19) (-1,25) (-0,s9) (-0.S8)
Working part-time -0,193 -(),~1~ -0.15S -0.164
(-0.47) (-(),52) (-0.39) (-0.41)
57Table 3 (continued)
Unemployed 0.030 0.020 0.095 0.084
(0.04) (0.03) (0.13) (0.12)
Infrequent religious participation 0.019 0.013 0.032 0.045
(0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0,14)
Frequent religious participation -0.970 -1.007 -0.727 -0.71 I
(-2.24) (-2.34) (-1.85) (-1.81)
Married -2.649 -2.658 -2,413 -2.414
(-6.04) (-6.05) (-5.85) (-5.85)
Engaged -1.598 -1.588 -1.478 -1,474
(-3.42) (-3.39) (-3.26) (-3.25)
Separated or divorced -0.371 -0.383 -0.282 -OZ66
(-0.50) (-0,51) (-0.39) (-0.36)
Number of children -0.128 -0.147 -0,098 -0.094
(-0.39) (-0.44) (-0,31) (-0.29)
1978 2.731 2.819 1.748 1,719
(1.87) (1.88) (1.30) (1.25)
[979 ~,349 2,423 1.337 1.311
(1.79) (1.80) (1.14) ( 1 09)
1980 2.592 2.608 1.811 1.7s3
(2.60) (2.55) (2,05) ( 1.97)
1981 2.940 2.985 ?.328 ~,jo~
(3,42) (3,42) (2.98) (2.90)
1982 [.851 1.841 1.311 1.263
(2.45) (2.39) (1,90) (1.80)
1983 0.557 0.597 -0.050 i -0.076
(0.78) (0.83) (-0,08) (-0.12)
1984 [,360 1.337 ().997 0.955
(2,30) (2,25) (1.81) (1.73)
1985 I .939 1,897 1,784 [,747
(3,47] (3.36) (3.28) (3,20)
1986 0.535 0.516 0,473 (),463
(1.08) (1.03) (0.97) (0.95)
[<-squared 0.045 0.045 0.240 0240
liausman chi-squared 3.~27 4,077
N S.9?6 8.9?6 8.926 8.926
Note: ~lsymptotic t-statistics in parentheses, and intercepts not shown.
58Table 4
Price Elasticities of Demand
Two-Stage Least Ordinary Least
Squares Squares
Panel A: Participation (1) (2) (3) (4)
Long run -1.560 -1.400 -1.378 -1.264
Short run -0.798 -0.716 -0.735 -0.675
Temporary current -0.335 -0.304 -0.365 -0,336
Temporary past -0.164 -0.149 -0.170 -0.156
Temporary future -0.194 -0.175 -0.184 -0.169
Panel B: Frequency Given
Positive Participation
Long run -0,485 -0,452 -0.492 -0.443
Short run -0.358 -0.348 -0,319 -0,288
Temporary current -0,273 -0.265 -0,211 -0.191
Temporaty past -0,071 -0.061 -0,074 -0,067
Tempora~ future -0.065 -0.063 -0.071 -0,064
Panel C: Unconditionala
Long run -2.044 -1.852 -1,870 -1.707
Short run -1.156 -1.064 -1.054 -0.963
Temporary current -0.608 -0.570 -0.576 -0.526
Temporary past -0.235 -0.210 -0.244 -0.223
TemDoraw future -0.259 -(-l 738 -0.255 -0.233
‘ Unconditional long-run elasticity, for example, equals the sum of long-run participation elasticity and long-
run frequency elasticity.
59Table 5
Price and Consumption Coefficients,
Year and Age Variables Omitteda
Two-Stage Least Ordinary Least
Squares Squares




Past participation (11.88) (86.55)
0.439 0.410





Long run -0.633 -0.493
Short run -0.290 -0,261
Temporary current -0.123 -0.129





Past frequency (2.80) (29.67)
0.191 0.303





Long run -0.245 -0.278
Short run -0.197 -0.181
Temporary current -0.158 -0.120
=Drinking age and marijuana decriminalization measures omitted from both models. Asymptotic t-
statistics in parentheses,
60Table 6
Price and Consumption Coefficients,
Two-Stage Least Squares Fixed-Effects Modelsa




Past participation (3.60) (3.68)
0.298 0.283
Future participation (4.23) (4.05)
R-squared 0.022 0,023
Hausman chi-squared 96.031 94.542
N 35,494 35,494
Elasticities
Long run -0.550 -0.536
Short run -0.428 -0.416
Temporary current -0,291 -0.290





Past frequency (2.51) (2.07)
0,289 0.256
Future frequency (2.82) (2.64)
R-squared 0.027 0.029
Hausman chi-squared 50.636 49.547
N 7,763 7,763
Elasticities
Long run -0.313 -0.265
Short run -0.192 -0.194
Temporary current -0.129 -0.141
a Drinking age and marijuana decrim inalization measures omitted from the first model and included in the
second model. Asymptotic t-statistics in parentheses.
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